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1. Introduction
Development in Southeast Asia was ushered  by autocrats such as Suharto 
in Indonesia (Elson, 2001) Sarit (Thak, 2007) and Prem (Muscat, 1994; Anek, 
1988) in Thailand, Lee (Lee, 2000) in Singapore, and Mahathir in Malaysia 
(Khoo, 1995)]. But over time, Indonesia and Thailand democratised rapidly 
while Singapore and Malaysia remained more or less semi-democratic. As 
Reilly (2006) has shown, the institutions of democracy in Indonesia, Malaysia 
and Thailand ( hereafter IMT), and in East Asia had taken a  centripetal thrust, 
adopting a combination of  majoritarian electoral systems (Reilly, 2006, 109-
112), political party systems that favour  institutionalisation of a small number 
of large bridging parties (Reilly, 2006, 131-142), and forms of executive 
government that increase government stability (Reilly, 2006: 146-166).
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Abstract: How has democracy impacted growth in Southeast Asia? This 
question can be answered by demonstrating how political elites in Indonesia, 
Malaysia and Thailand crafted quite unique democratic developmental states 
that enabled them to provide the public goods and public policies to maintain 
high growth.  Because of this, growth under democracy has been as high as it 
was during the heyday of these polities’ developmental autocracies. Moreover, 
as there was no single dominant pathway to the construction of democratic 
development in these polities, it looks like political elites were able to take local 
conditions and history into account suggesting that political elites have been 
as effective in selectively intervening in the structure of democratic politics as 
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White (2006) and Robinson and White (1998) have suggested that these 
democracies presage the emergence of democratic developmental states or 
democratic governments that are more effective in delivering public goods and 
growth, but also decidedly less representative of the range of interests extant in 
many, if not most, polities, particularly those with multi-ethnic and/or multi-
religious communities like in IMT.  In a recent paper, Rock (2013) demonstrated 
that East Asia’s centripetal democracies, including IMT, have been a growth 
enhancer just like the region’s developmental autocracies. While Rock’s reduced 
form regression results are encouraging, they beg an important question. How 
did the adoption of more centripetal democratic political institutions in East 
Asia’s new developmental democracies influence economic growth? 
  The aim here is to answer this question by re-constructing, via three 
comparative case studies, the emergence of centripetal democracies in IMT, 
and linking the selective adoption of more centripetal democratic institutions 
to economic growth.  The next three sections develop country case studies of 
the causal mechanisms linking the emergence of more centripetal democratic 
political institutions to development policies and growth in IMT. The final 
section summarises main findings and provides conclusions.
2. Creating a Developmental Democracy in Indonesia1
Prior to the collapse of the New Order, few conditions suggested a 
democratic transition was near. Economic performance remained strong.2 
Despite growing opposition to Suharto and his re-election in 1997 (Aspinall, 
2005: 242), the New Order regime appeared well-entrenched. Because Indonesia 
lacked the traits associated with democratisation3, few expected Suharto to 
resign, the New Order to collapse, or Indonesia to become a robust democracy 
(Aspinall, 2005: 252). Virtually no one expected Indonesia to consolidate its 
democracy or return development performance to the levels experienced under 
the New Order.4 The country appears to have done both. How did Indonesia 
manage that? 
One hypothesis is political engineering — the deliberate creation of more 
centripetal political institutions by political insiders (Horowitz, 2013)—lies at 
the centre of the story of the consolidation of democracy and of the return to 
robust economic performance. As is well known, the collapse of the economy 
in 1998 ignited widespread popular mobilisation from below and widespread 
violence (Aspinall, 2010: 26 and 2005: 252). These events, alongside massive 
capital flight (Pepinsky, 2009:155) and the killing of university students by 
security forces, precipitated elite defection from and disintegration of the 
New Order (Webber, 2006: 407). From the vantage point of 1998, Indonesia’s 
democratic transition looked like a classic ‘ruptura’ (Aspinall, 2005: 271) — a 
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mode of transition considered unlikely to lead to a consolidation of democracy 
(Karl, 1990: 8). Subsequently, the old New Order elites quickly captured the 
state and Indonesia’s new democratic institutions, shifting the post-transition 
period to pact-making between the country’s new democratic elites and the 
military on one hand and between new democratic elites and separatists on the 
other hand (Aspinall, 2010). While Slater (2004), Webber (2006) and Hadiz 
(2003) have criticised the impact of this particular transition on the quality of 
democracy, Aspinall (2010) states that concessions to the military and separatists 
alongside absorption of Islamists into the democratic mainstream enabled 
Indonesia to consolidate democracy.  
By themselves, rapid collapse of the New Order and a shift to democratic 
pact-making do not sufficiently explain the ability of new democratic elites 
to consolidate democracy or put development back on track. Three other key 
developments — creation of more centripetal democratic institutions (Reilly, 
2006), building a more effective government by tackling corruption (Butt, 2011) 
and keeping the economists and institutions of macroeconomic policy-making 
in their place of prominence in government (Aswicahyono, et al., 2009, Bird, 
et al., 2008 and Boediono, 2005 and 2002) — also mattered. 
As Horowitz (2013:46-53) shows, political insiders ignored outsiders’ 
calls for more radical innovations and used existing institutions to craft a new 
democratic political foundation and a revised constitution to move Indonesia’s 
transitional democracy in a more centripetal direction.  The turn towards more 
centripetal political institutions occurred in a series of fits and starts. All the 
major aspects of Indonesia’s centripetal democracy were not in place until 
the 2004 presidential election.5 In 1999, political elites reaffirmed the 1945 
constitution (King, 2004: 8), a unitary state, a presidential form of government 
(King 2004: 18) and rejected parliamentary democracy as inappropriate for 
Indonesia (King, 2004: 143).  At the same time, Indonesia adopted proportional 
(PR) electoral rules, but with closed party lists to generate greater party cohesion 
(Slater, 2004: 75). The 1999 electoral law also established party thresholds 
for participation in subsequent elections (Sulistyo, 2002: 81). And Indonesia 
adopted large district magnitudes (Sulistyo, 2002: 80) to ensure adequate 
representation of Indonesia’s pluralist interests (King, 2004:150) while it 
weakened the presidency (King, 2004:53-54 and 76). Finally, to compete in 
the 1999 election, political parties had to establish branches in one-third of 
Indonesia’s provinces and party offices in more than half of the districts or 
municipalities in those provinces (Reilly, 2006: 133).  The net effect of these new 
rules on the political system was not entirely clear. Rejection of parliamentary 
democracy as inappropriate for Indonesia (Horowitz, 2013: 27), continuation 
of a unitary state and a presidential form of government had the potential to 
strengthen the centripetal character of democratic political institutions. The 
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same can be said for both geographic coverage/penetration rules and for the 
use of party thresholds aimed at reducing fragmentation of the party system. 
But a weakened presidency and adoption of PR electoral rules even with closed 
party lists, alongside large district magnitudes, had likely pushed the political 
system in a centrifugal direction. 
Subsequently, political elites reversed the process by directing the 
institutions of democracy in a more centripetal direction. Initially, they did 
so by using constitutional amendment to strengthen the presidency (King, 
2004: 54). In response to growing pressures for greater regional autonomy, 
Indonesia implemented ‘big bang’ decentralisation in 2001, but it did so in a 
way that protected its unitary state while keeping the separatist movements 
in check (Fitrani et al., 2005: 61). One consequence of decentralisation was 
an increase in the number of electoral districts. As electoral districts became 
smaller, district magnitudes fell from 17.5 in 1999 to 8 in 2004 and 7.3 in 2009, 
increasing centripetal tendencies as winning seat thresholds rose from 5.7% 
of the votes in 1999 to 12.5% in 2004 and 13.7% in 2009 (Choi, 2009: 673). 
As Carey and Hix (2011) have shown in other contexts, Indonesia’s decline in 
district magnitudes puts it squarely in an electoral sweet spot — one enabling it 
to maximise the benefits of its PR electoral rule without encouraging too much 
unruliness or losing too much in the way of accountability that enables voters 
to reward parties for good performance or punish them for poor performance. 
Finally, the government added to its geographic coverage/penetration rules 
for political parties by adopting additional rules for participation by political 
parties that pushed them to aggregate interests and compete for the political 
centre (Choi, 2004: 679-80). A similar set of rules governed party candidates 
for president (Choi, 2004:682).  
Why did Indonesia’s political insiders opt to create a more centripetal 
democracy by incremental means? Horowitz (2013:6) argues that this choice 
was driven by the country’s  social endowments and history. Social endowments, 
particularly its ethnic, religious and cultural cleavages, Outer Island fears of 
Javanese domination, and differences among Modernist and traditional Muslims 
and between Muslims and secular nationalists, led elites to favour incremental 
reform and the 1945 constitution over crafting a new constitution because they 
feared for the unitary state and secular nationalism (Horowitz, 2013: 41). 
History, particularly the experience of the 1950s, pushed reform in a 
centripetal direction. Here, the fears focused on mass violence, territorial 
separatism, deliberative deadlock, and party fragmentation (Horowitz, 2013: 
22). To the insider political elites charting a path to stable democracy, the 
violence, regional discontent, and separatist insurgencies of the 1990s looked 
all too eerily familiar to the violence, regional rebellions, and military revolts 
of the 1950s (Horowitz, 2013: 25). Given this, some form of decentralisation 
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was seen as essential (Horowitz, 2013: 73).  But to protect the unitary state and 
limit fissiparous tendencies, decentralisation was applied to kabupaten and kota 
rather than provinces. This same set of fears led political elites to strengthen 
the presidency. They did this due to fear that a fragmented country (ethnic and 
religious fault lines) with a weak executive could lead to the break-up of the 
country (Horowitz, 2013: 39).
Fears of deadlock and legislative and party fragmentation were also rooted 
in the experience of the 1950s. The deadlock and failure of the Konstituante 
(the Constitutional Assembly of Indonesia) of the 1950s to rewrite the 1945 
constitution was viewed as opening the door for Sukarno’s authoritarian Guided 
Democracy (Horowitz, 2013:26). Fearing a stalemate on the same issues, 
especially the role of Islam (Horowitz, 2013:26), political elites rebuffed 
calls for a constitutional convention (Horowitz, 2013: 53) and reaffirmed the 
1945 constitution. In addition, the experience of the 1950s with parliamentary 
government and the 1955 elections taught reformers to fear legislative and party 
fragmentation (Horowitz, 2013: 27). Because of this, they opted for electoral 
rules and rules governing political parties participation in elections designed 
to strengthen centripetal tendencies.  
How successful has the push toward more centripetal political institutions 
been? Reilly (2006) contends that democratic political institutions have moved 
in a centripetal direction. Mietzner (2008) shows that after democratisation, 
Indonesia’s political parties have been competing for votes in the political 
centre.6 Voters appear to have responded to these campaign promises by 
throwing out parties and leaders viewed as corrupt or unable to restore growth,7 
and they rewarded parties and political leaders who have delivered on their 
promises to promote development.8 This outcome alone creates incentives for 
political parties and elected presidents to continue to rely on the country’s 
economists attached to core macroeconomic institutions — the central bank, 
the Ministry of Finance and BAPPENAS — for council and advice. It also 
helped that democratically elected governments have become more stable 
(Reilly, 2006: 154).    
Not surprisingly then, political elites have taken steps to build a 
somewhat more effective government while keeping the government’s core 
macroeconomic institutions in their positions of prominence. To begin with, 
Indonesia’s anti-corruption commission has successfully prosecuted a number 
of highly visible anti-corruption cases (Butt, 2011: 381; Mietzner, 2009: 146-
150).  There is also some evidence of success in prosecuting cases of the more 
local and decentralised corruption that emerged following Indonesia’s big bang 
decentralisation (Rinaldi, et al., 2007). This may well account for the substantial 
improvement in Indonesia’s control of corruption score recorded by the Political 
Risk Services Group (2013).  It may also explain why there has not been much 
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deterioration in the Political Risk Services Bureaucratic Quality score for 
Indonesia following democratisation (Political Risk Services Group, 2013).  
 Equally important, successive governments sought the advice of the 
country’s economists in core macroeconomic institutions. Given their highly 
successful role during the New Order, this is not particularly surprising.  But 
now, political elites, particularly presidents, turn to them to help them stay in 
power by delivering development. There are numerous examples of this. In 
1998, President Habibie relied on the advice of the country’s macroeconomists 
as he saw it as his best chance for succeeding as president (Boediono, 2002: 
388). Even during the phlegmatic Wahid Administration, Indonesia’s democratic 
government adhered to a traditional macroeconomic stabilisation programme 
(Boediono, 2002: 390). During Megawati’s presidency, the important economic 
portfolios were more insulated, the economic team more cohesive and like-
minded, and the government was able to establish macroeconomic stability 
(Boediono, 2005: 315). Subsequently, the government strengthened the role 
of economists in democratic governments by creating a ‘cordon sanitaire’ 
around core macroeconomic institutions and principles by adopting a 1999 law 
guaranteeing the independence of the central bank and by stipulating in Fiscal 
Law 17/2003 that fiscal deficits be kept below 2% of GDP and the debt to GDP 
ratio lower than 60% (Aswicahyono et al., 2009: 357). As Aswicahyono, et al. 
(2009: 357) conclude, Indonesia’s macroeconomic policy framework has been 
quite effective.  
 But this is not the only evidence that successive democratic governments 
relied on technocrats. Trade policy reform floundered under Wahid and 
Megawati, the Yudhoyono government committed itself to “tariffication” of 
the remaining NTBs and a lowering of tariff rates (Bird et al., 2008: 952-954). 
Responsibility for trade liberalisation was under an inter-ministerial committee, 
Team Tariff, housed in the Ministry of Finance (Bird et al., 2008: 952). Tariff 
harmonisation was expected to lead to a decline in the MFN tariff rate from 8.7% 
in 2004 to 7.7% in 2010 (Bird et al., 2008: 953). The actual MFN tariff fell to 
5.4% by 2008 (Marks and Rahardja, 2012: 64). Although there has been some 
backsliding (Bird et al., 2008:955-957), on the whole democratic governments 
in Indonesia have been able to sustain a trade liberalisation programme that 
began in the mid-1980s. 
 Arguably, the shift in Indonesia towards a more centripetal democracy 
played an important role in reining in corruption, in introducing sound 
macro-economic policies, in continuing support for trade liberalisation, and 
in achieving growth rates similar to those of  the New Order.  This outcome 
reflects that voters (Mujani and Liddle, 2010:42-44), including Muslims, 
expect governments to deliver on development goals (Pepinsky et al.,2012: 
10).  In addition, it became possible for presidents and parties to focus on clean 
government and development partly because concessions to potential spoilers
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of democracy in the military removed their possible intervention in politics. 
It was facilitated by decentralisation and concessions to potential separatists 
in Aceh and Papua that reduced the likelihood of  territorial fragmentation 
(Aspinall, 2011). But this outcome would not have been possible without the 
emergence of a centripetal party system that revolves around three major parties 
that compete for the political centre (Aspinall, 2010: 29).  Nor would this 
outcome have been likely without regular national campaigns for president and 
vice president that have driven candidates and their parties to the political centre.
3. Malaysia’s Developmental Semi-Democracy
At independence,  observers of Malaysia thought that it was in for 
“… devastating, Malay-Chinese conflict… (Horowitz, 1989: 18)” 
 Despite this prediction, ethnic conflict in Malaysia has been more or less 
contained enabling government elites to focus on development. As a result, 
Malaysia has sustained high growth rates, successfully diversified the economy 
away from a small number of primary exports, moved up the value added 
processing chain, significantly reduced the incidence of poverty, and more or 
less eliminated a longstanding relationship between economic function and race 
(Rock and Sheridan, 2007). It has also reduced income inequality (Kuhonta, 
2011) How did this happen? The answers provided below focus on political 
institutions, particularly the deliberate creation of a centripetal (Reilly, 2011: 
289-299) and an at least semi-democratic, if not democratic, developmental 
state in Malaysia that developed effective mechanisms for containing ethnic 
violence while pushing the country’s major political parties to the political 
centre all but forcing them to provide the public goods and public policies that 
enhance growth and development. 
 Neither was easy to do and both required developing institutions and 
policies to overcome the legacies of British colonialism — the identification 
of race with economic function (Jomo,1986:58-66, 122, 157-173, 228 and 
Harper,1999: 228), the disadvantaged position of the Malays, and a shift in 
the population balance favouring immigrants (von Vory, 1975: 23). From the 
perspectives of the Malays, this was a nasty brew as it raised fears that they 
would become second class citizens in the land of the Malays (Harper, 1999: 
32).  To make matters worse, the spread of communism, the Great Depression, 
internal turmoil in China and Japanese aggression contributed to a political 
awakening in both the Chinese (Heng,1988: 6, 20-21; von Vorys, 1975: 52) 
and Malay communities (von Vorys, 1975: 41;  Harper, 1999: 32).  The ethnic 
division of labour and political awakening were potentially explosive.  
 Unfortunately, the Japanese occupation (Cheah,1983:20-22, 26-27,33-34), 
ethnic violence that flared up between the end of the occupation and the return
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of the British (von Vory, 1975: 64 and Cheah, 1981: 109), and an anti-communist 
Emergency only inflamed racial tensions.
 Against this backdrop, the British reoccupied Malaya and proposed the 
Malayan Union — a multi-ethnic and democratic state with a highly centralised 
government (Lau, 1991). An emerging Malay national leadership mobilised 
ordinary Malays against the Union which culminated in the creation of the 
United Malays National Organization (UMNO) in 1946 (von Vorys,1975: 
67-68;  Kuhonta, 2011: 61-64). Following rejection of the Malayan Union by 
Malay elites, the British created an Anglo-Malay Working Committee to rewrite 
the constitution (Lau, 1991: 188-211). The outcome, the Federation of Malaya 
Agreement, created a strong central, but federal government, preserved the role 
of the Sultans in each federated Malay state, severely restricted citizenship 
for non-Malays and recognised the special rights of the Malays.The colonial 
government also re-established the leadership role of the traditional leaders 
of the Chinese community while undermining the Malayan Communist Party 
(Cheah, 1983: 214;  Heng, 1988: 43-45). They encouraged the English-educated 
Chinese elite to form a political party to rally Chinese support against the 
communist insurgency and protect their capital (Heng, 1988: 55, 84-85).
 The insurgency also led the British to create a Community Liaison 
Committee (CLC) to promote consociational democracy. The major outcomes 
of the CLC were Malay acceptance of liberal citizenship rights for the Chinese 
(Heng, 1988: 155), Chinese acceptance of the special rights of the Malays, 
and the articulation by UMNO of an aggressive corporatist economic reform 
programme to create a group of Malay capitalists (Heng, 1988: 52). 
 Subsequently, the British extended local level elections to include major 
urban areas. Because most Malayan cities were dominated by the Chinese, 
UMNO needed MCA help to win these elections (Horowitz, 1989: 27-28) which 
the leaders of MCA readily agreed (Heng, 1988: 156-159).  Together, the two 
parties pooled votes by running an ethnically mixed, but common, single slate 
of candidates that captured 26 of 34 seats (Horowitz, 2000: 399).  Electoral 
success led to a creation of a formal Alliance in 1954. In 1955, the Alliance, 
which included the Malayan Indian Congress (MIC), won 51 of 52 seats in 
the first election for a Federal Legislative Council (Horowitz, 2000: 401). This 
election enshrined three key elements of Malaysia’s centripetal democracy — 
a plurality electoral rule in single-member districts (Lim, 2000: 103), cross 
ethnic vote pooling around a single slate (Horowitz, 2000: 401), and political 
party competition rooted in moderation on policy issues (Kuhonta, 2011: 25). 
 Why did the governing eli tes use the power of the state 
to promote development?  While the country’s centripetal political 
institutions provides at least a partial answer to this question, several 
other considerations loomed large. To begin with, the Malay political 
elites, particularly Prime Minister Mahathir who came to dominate 
successive governments in Malaysia’s centripetal semi-democracy have
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been keen in increasing national power and projecting the country in a world 
dominated by the West (Khoo, 1995:17). For them, development is an important 
component of national power (Khoo, 1995:67), a goal in its own right (Khoo, 
1995: 57), and a vehicle for consolidating and sustaining their own political 
regimes (Khoo, 1995: 73). Political leaders in UMNO have been particularly 
committed to nationalist and industrial development agendas for indigenous 
Malays. Because of this, the nationalist agenda in Malaysia has been to protect 
the ‘special rights’ of the indigenous Malays (Means, 1972). Because the ruling 
UMNO is strongly anti-socialist, anti-communist and pro-capitalist (Jomo, 
1986: 243, 247), its alignment with an equally anti-communist and pro-capitalist 
Chinese political party meant that development would take place within the 
confines of a capitalist development model, although not a free market one.
 How did the Malay elites who controlled the state use their power to 
promote a prosperous and capitalist Malaysia? As the British left Malaysia 
with a relatively strong central government (Slater, 2010: 74-93) and a small, 
but highly effective civil administration that was and is committed to basic 
macroeconomic stability (Ismail and Meyanathan, 1993: 3), governments have 
tended to get macroeconomic policy fundamentals right. But how centripetal 
governments pursued their broader development objectives varied.  Before the 
race riots of 1969 that threatened both the Alliance government and ethnic peace, 
development strategy focused on selective interventions in agriculture and 
rural development that benefited Malays as well as a more or less laissez faire 
approach to industrial development. After the race riots of 1969, the government 
retooled the Alliance government (Kuhonta, 2011: 88), UMNO (Kuhonta, 
2011: 83-86 and 97), the state (Kuhonta, 2011: 84, 96-97) strengthened the 
ruling party’s and the state’s centripetal capabilities so it could maintain ethnic 
peace, stifle dissent, and pursue a more directly interventionist and pro-Malay 
development policy. 
 Prior to the race riots of 1969, the government focused its development 
efforts on rural economic activities (Ismail and Meyanathan, 1993: 4), primarily 
in rice and palm oil (Bruton,et al.,1992: 233-242; Pletcher, 1991), beneficial 
to Malays.  The government’s rice programme required substantial public 
expenditures on irrigation (Goldman,1975: 265), land expansion (Goldman, 
1975: 265), infrastructure, marketing of rice (Mokhtar and Meyanathan, 1988: 
103), and promotion of fast-breeding, high-yielding rice varieties that worked 
well in Malaysia (Goldman,1975: 267). It was hoped that modernisation of 
rice planting would reduce Malaysia’s dependence on the vagaries of  world 
rice market (Fitzpatrick, 1992: 125) and increase the incomes of poor Malay 
rice farmers.  
 The government also intervened in oil palm plantation. Initially, expansion 
of the area devoted to oil palm was facilitated by the government allowing 
private planters to use rubber replanting grants to grow oil palm trees (Pletcher,
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1991: 625). Subsequently, the Federal Land Development Authority (FELDA), 
a government agency, launched an aggressive resettlement scheme based on 
several crops, particularly oil palm (Pletcher, 1991: 625). As a consequence, 
the area under oil palm expanded rapidly from 54,700ha in 1960 (Pletcher, 
1991: 625) to 258,428ha in 1970 (Pletcher, 1990: 330). 
 Despite these selective interventions designed to benefit the Malays, the 
incidence of poverty among rural Malays remained stubbornly high. When 
the Chinese began contesting for control of the state, the outcome was the 
race riots of 1969.  The government responded by restructuring the Alliance 
party and by strengthening both UMNO and the state so that the latter could 
pursue a more pro-Malay development agenda under its New Economic Policy 
(NEP).  The NEP committed the government to reducing poverty irrespective 
of race (Bruton et al.,1992: 271) and ‘restructuring’ the Malaysian society to 
eliminate the identification of race with economic function (Jomo, 1986: 256). 
Rapid economic growth was seen as critical to meeting both goals (Ismail and 
Meyanathan, 1993: 6). 
 Under the NEP, the government accelerated its selective interventions in 
rice and oil palm plantations. In rice, intervention first turned to squeezing the 
margins of traders and millers in the hope that this would increase farmers’ 
incomes (Pletcher, 1988: 191). To that end, the government created the National 
Padi and Rice Authority (Lembaga Padi dan Beras Negara, or LPN) in 1971 
(Mokhtar and Meyanathan, 1998: 109). The LPN used its authority to stabilise 
rice prices at a high level (Mokhtar and Meyanathan, 1988: 107, 130; Rock, 
2002: 492) at some cost to economic efficiency (Mokhtar and Meyanthan, 1988: 
120-121, 139).  Despite this intervention, poverty among Malay rice farmers 
persisted (Jomo, 1990; Mehmet, 1986). This led the government to increase 
other subsidies to rice farmers (Mokhtar and Meyanathan, 1988: 107-108). 
Taken together, government intervention provided farmers with a stable rice 
prices (Rock, 2002: 492) and increased rice self-sufficiency (Goldman, 1975: 
263; Mokhtar and Meyanathan, 1988:100).  
 Government intervention in oil palm focused on capturing control of the 
foreign-owned oil palm plantations, resolving collective action problems, and 
correcting market failures in the processing of crude palm oil.  The government 
gained control of foreign owned estates in a process of ‘velvet’ nationalisation 
without reducing growth (Pletcher, 1991: 630-631). Take-over of foreign estates 
and rapid expansion of crop area to oil palm was complemented by aggressive 
use of an export duty on unprocessed oil palm to overcome a market failure in 
domestic value-added processing of crude palm oil (CPO) (Gopal, 1999: 361 
and 366). 
 The effect of the duty was to reduce the domestic price of CPO and 
increase domestic processing margins (Gopal, 1999: 366). This policy was 
wildly successful — in 1975, Malaysia was refining less than 10% of its CPO, 
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but by 1994, it was refining  99.2% of CPO while refining capacity reached 
a little more than 10 million tonnes (Gopal, 1999: 363 and Moll, 1987).  The 
government also selectively and successfully intervened in applied research on 
processed palm oil products (Fold, 2000: 478 and Pletcher, 1991: 627).  And 
it has been actively involved in maintaining quality control in processed palm 
oil products (Pletcher, 1991: 631-632) and in the international marketing of 
them (Fold, 2000: 476 and Pletcher, 1991:634).
 In addition, the government used its enhanced capabilities to implement 
a stunningly successful and growth-oriented affirmative action programme 
(Rasiah and Ishak, 2001: 6; Bruton et al., 1992). Following a downturn in the 
world economy, the government responded with a classic austerity programme 
(Khoo, 1995: 115), by privatising numerous state-owned enterprises (Bowie, 
1994: 178-181), liberalising the foreign investment and trade regimes, and by 
‘holding the NEP in abeyance’ (Khoo, 1995: 140-141). These policy changes 
coincided with the Northeast Asian newly industrialising economies relocating 
their industries to the second tier NICs in Southeast Asia, including Malaysia. 
This sparked a growth and export boom, a general rise in consumption and 
living standards (Khoo, 2003: 17) as well as a rising stock market (Khoo, 2003: 
23).
 Rapid economic growth, the success of the NEP, particularly the creation 
of a Malay capitalist class, made it possible for Mahathir to declare that the 
NEP had been a great success (Khoo, 2003: 20) and that it was time to end it 
(Khoo, 2003: 22).  As a result, Mahathir began reconstructing industrial policies 
and the institutions of industrial policies to achieve technological-capabilities 
building objectives (Jomo, 2007; Felker, 2001: 138; Felker, 1999: 103-104). 
Subsequently, the government completely re-organised and upgraded its public 
sector science and technology programmes (Felker and Jomo,1999: 20-21 and 
Rasiah, 1999: 191). By the early 1990s, these “reforms…created an increasingly 
coherent and dynamic policy system in S&T as well as in broader industrial 
policy arenas” (Felker, 1999: 112,114-115). 
 This new industrial policy system demonstrated a commitment to a new 
approach to technological upgrading in local firms via a Vendor Development 
Programme (Lim, 2004:7 and (Felker, 1999:118), an Industrial Linkage 
Programme (Lim, 2004:8), and a Global Supplier Programme (Lim, 2004: 
9).  Each of these programme aimed to promote technological upgrading by 
linking local firms with the global value chains of multinational corporations. 
Despite numerous criticisms of these new policies (Jomo, 2007; Lim and Ong, 
2007; Rasiah, 1998; Best, 1999; Tan, 1999) 9, there is substantial evidence via 
case studies (Rasiah, 2001; McKendrick et al., 2000; Doner and Hershberg, 
1999; Narayanan et al., 1997; Churchill,1995 and Lai et al., 1994) and some 
statistical evidence (Flaaen et al., 2013: 13, 14-16,33-35, and 45-46; Yusof and 
Bhattasali, 2008: 11) that this new strategy is working. 
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 In sum, there is therefore substantial evidence to suggest that the governing 
elites in Malaysia successfully pursued an aggressive development agenda. 
Commitment to a development agenda flowed directly from Malaysia’s 
centripetal institutions which pushed the political parties in the Alliance to the 
moderate centre forcing them to provide the public goods and public policies 
necessary to develop the economy. But commitment to development, at least 
within UMNO, also flowed from the disadvantaged position of the Malays 
at independence. Governing elites in Malaysia were also fortunate that the 
British left them with a strong centralised state. Given their commitment 
to development and their control of a strong centralised state, ruling elites 
maintained macroeconomic stability and selectively intervened in those 
rural activities beneficial to Malays. When this strategy failed to reduce 
poverty and inequality, UMNO elites re-negotiated the political bargain and 
strengthened its capabilities and the state so it could launch a highly successful 
and growth-oriented affirmative action programme that reduced poverty and 
inequality while virtually eliminating the identification of race with economic 
function. The success of this strategy subsequently enabled governing elites 
to shift development strategy, this time focusing on building the technological 
capabilities of Malaysia’s firms.  It is difficult to believe that any of this 
would have been possible without the creation of the centripetal democratic 
institutions— a plurality electoral rule in single member districts, cross ethnic 
vote pooling around a single slate, and centrist moderation on policy issues 
— that enabled ruling elites to mitigate ethnic conflict so they could focus on 
development.  
4.  Thailand’s Democratic Developmental State
The origin of Thailand’s democratic development state lies in the forced 
opening of the economy in 1855. The Thai monarchy responded by turning 
to administrative reforms and political change to preserve Thai independence. 
Administrative reforms extended central control over the outlying provinces, 
significantly enhanced the state’s ability to tax, and weakened traditional 
regional power bases (Wyatt, 1984;Chai-anan, 1971:30). These changes 
were accompanied by the gradual abolition of slavery and the replacement 
of corvee labour with a rural society of small producers with little political 
influence. By 1927, the outlines of the modern Thai political economy were 
set. The centre (Bangkok) had moulded a loosely integrated collection of 
semiautonomous provinces into a nation-state by a triad of forces consisting 
of a highly centralised bureaucracy that invested in defence and the transport 
system, a freed peasantry that expanded the area under cultivation and Chinese 
traders and European exporters who facilitated the rice trade (Chai-anan, 1971: 
78; Feeny, 1982: 80-81).  
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 Subsequent political developments reinforced the tendency toward a 
centralised state, a weak political party system, and unstable political institutions 
(Chai-anan, 1982: 1-2). The 1932 “revolution” completed the transfer of 
political power from royal elites to Western-trained bureaucratic elites (Morell 
and Chai-anan, 1981: 13-16). But it wasn’t until Sarit came to power in 1958 that 
political elites in the centralised state began to promote development (Muscat, 
1994: 88).  Within a few short years Sarit developed close ties with the World 
Bank and economic technocrats in the Thai bureaucracy (Muscat, 1994: 88). 
He eliminated discrimination against the Chinese, blocked the growth of state-
owned enterprises, and relied on the private sector for development (Muscat, 
1994: 88). He also created the technocratic institutions — a Bureau of the 
Budget, the National Economic Development Board, the Board of Investment, 
and the Fiscal Policy Office in the Ministry of Finance—that along with the 
Bank of Thailand came to dominate economic policymaking in successive Thai 
governments (Muscat, 1994: 92). 
 Between 1960 and 1987 the technocrats in these macroeconomic agencies 
engaged in sound  macro-economic management (Christensen et al., 1993: 26-
28). Urban wage rates, including the social wage, were kept near their scarcity 
values (Bertrand and Squire, 1980).  The government also took advantage of 
a large land frontier to manipulate an industrious (Keyes, 1983) but politically 
docile peasantry by giving peasants access to land (Piker, 1976) while taxing 
them heavily (Wong, 1987: 72; Ammar, 1975).   
 At the same time, the government extracted agricultural resources from 
the countryside without impoverishing the peasantry and built an import-
substitution industrial (ISI) base around the deliberate creation of a small 
number of commercial banks (Hewison, 1989: 283; Suehiro, 1992: 48-49) 
that amassed savings, allocated credit, and acted as investment coordinators 
(Ammar, 2011:68).  As in banking, the building of an ISI base behind protective 
barriers (Narongchai, 1973) was selective as government policies systematically 
favoured large firms and a few Sino-Thai entrepreneurs. One effect of this bias 
was the domination of Thai industry by large firms which merged into family-
centred conglomerates (Suehiro, 1992: 37). 
 By the mid-1980s, the Thai economy reached a turning point.  Stagnating 
yields under fixed technologies, the closing of the land frontier, and low factor 
productivity growth rates in ISI industries suggested diminishing returns from 
the old growth strategy (World Bank, 1980; Wiboonchutikula, 1987). As a result, 
government elites opted for an export-led industrial (ELI) growth strategy.  If 
there had not been a change in the relationship between groups in civil society 
and the Thai state, autonomous state actors in the core macroeconomic agencies 
might have found ways to lead a Northeast Asian-style transition to ELI growth. 
But the rapid socioeconomic change of the previous 25 years undermined the 
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legitimacy and autonomy of Thailand’s autocratic developmental state. It 
facilitated the emergence of a substantial urban middle class which turned to 
parties and electoral politics to protect its interests (Girling, 1984; Dalpino, 
1991; Anek, 1988). Increasing financial independence of the Sino-Thai business 
community, especially the large conglomerates, insulated business from 
the reaches of government (Prasartset, 1982). Government control of trade 
associations declined and representatives of those associations penetrated the 
public sector (Prasartset, 1982: 53-67). The business community also began 
to play a more prominent role in Thai cabinets as it learned how to collaborate 
with the public sector and use its resources to influence and control political 
parties (Bangkok Post, 1982: 31-32). As a result, a stable semi-democratic 
political system emerged and the old authoritarian developmental state gave 
way to a semi-democratic “broker polity” in which,
“the key figure (became) the prime minister who (had) the main 
responsibility for brokering a free for all between a growing number of 
organized constituencies...” (Dalpino,1991:61).
 Initially, this semi-democratic developmental state faced substantial 
difficulties in reforming policies to promote exports. It proved difficult to 
maintain a competitive exchange rate (Far Eastern Economic Review, Nov. 22, 
1984:14-17).  Business opposition to tax increases contributed to a savings-
investment gap that led the IMF to suspend lending to Thailand because the 
government could not reduce the public sector deficit (Far Eastern Economic 
Review, March 20, 1986: 122-124; June 26, 1986: 62; September 25, 1986: 
92).  The inability to raise taxes on the private sector contributed to a significant 
deterioration of public sector balances between 1973 and 1987.10 Governing 
elites also found it difficult to lower trade barriers.  They agreed to laissez faire 
style trade liberalisation in 10 industries in 1980 but only two industries showed 
promising development; government reformers suffered a notable setback in 
their attempt to liberalise trade in the electronics industry.  Subsequently, tariffs 
became even more, rather than less, protective (Narongchai et al.,1991: 15-17). 
 Fortunately, widespread support in the business community for open-
economy policies, at least in agriculture, enabled governing elites to devalue the 
baht despite the military’s opposition (Pongpaichit, 1980: 450).  The government 
responded to the inability to raise taxes by increasing the centralisation of 
economic policy-making and pursuing zero growth budgets (Christensen, 
1991: 99).  The inability to liberalise the trade regime along laissez faire lines 
led reformers to adopt a statist alternative (Wiboonchutikula, 1989: 51). The 
Japanese financed a long term Export Industry Modernization Program (EIMP) 
through the International Finance Corporation of Thailand at highly subsidised 
interest rates (Wiboonchutikula, 1989: 51). Promotional privileges -  including
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exemptions and/or reductions in import duties and business taxes on 
imported inputs, machinery, and equipment and exemptions from corporate 
income taxes – by the Board of Investment were extended to export projects 
(Wiboonchutikula,1989:56). The Bank of Thailand began subsidising the 
working capital needs of exporters.  By 1988, subsidised loans covered 40% 
of exports by value (Wiboonchutikula,1989:52).  
 These policies were sufficient to allow the economic transition as real 
GDP growth expanded rapidly.11 Growth was fed by a foreign investment and 
export boom.  Between 1986 and 1989, annual foreign direct investment flows 
and exports more than doubled (World Bank, 2013). By 1985, manufactured 
exports exceeded agricultural exports for the first time (Unger, 1991: 8). Textile 
exports increased fourfold between 1983 and 1989; integrated circuits exports 
doubled between 1985 and 1987; and exports of plastics and shoes more than 
doubled in 1988 alone. 
 The stability and prosperity throughout the 1980s contributed to even more 
significant changes in Thai politics.  Over time, Thailand’s growing middle class 
came to view authoritarian government as no longer appropriate for Thailand 
(Far Eastern Economic Review, May 16-22, 1992: 38).  Democratic values 
became more embedded, at least temporarily, in the value system of key elites 
(Far Eastern Economic Review, February 23-March 1, 1991: 36, May 9-15, 
1992: 38, May 16-22, 1992: 38 and June 20-26, 1992: 32).  By 1988, it was 
possible to elect a civilian prime minister. But this maturing of Thai democracy 
did not occur without substantial challenges. The carrying over of patron-
client politics into the newly elected civilian government diminished the role 
of politically neutral technocrats in economic policymaking.  This presaged a 
frontal assault on the state by civilian politicians (Christensen, 1991: 99). The 
opening up of the state to the “privatisation” of government projects provided 
justification for a military coup. Throughout this period (1988-1997), political 
instability increased as Thailand experienced two coups and had 11 prime 
ministers.   
 Following the military’s brutal attack on pro-democracy activists in 
Bangkok in May  1992, talk among political elites shifted to the need to revise 
the constitution to curb money politics, vote buying, abuses of power and 
government inefficiencies (Prawase, 2002: 21). Because the new constitution 
designed to correct these problems was majoritarian, it is difficult to believe that 
it wasn’t created so that democratic governments could enjoy macroeconomic 
stability, competitive exchange rates as well as develop and implement more 
programmatic policies and programmes that fostered growth and development. 
The 1997 financial crisis provided the impetus to bring revision of the 
constitution to fruition (Ammar, 2011: 70).  In the eyes of the reformers, existing
electoral rules, a candidate-centred electoral system, and weak prime ministers 
were responsible for generating large, unwieldy, and politically unstable and
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short-lived multi-coalition governments that were responsible for the 
politicisation of core macroeconomic agencies and for the inability of 
democratic governments to develop and implement broadly targeted policies or 
programmes necessary to sustain growth or deal with rising inequality (Hicken, 
2006: 388 and Kuhonta, 2006: 375).  
 To overcome these problems, reformers adopted a range of mutually 
reinforcing amendments to the Constitution that pushed the party system in a 
centripetal or majoritarian direction.  They replaced Thailand’s small multi-
member electoral districts with single member districts. They jettisoned the 
block vote electoral rule in favour of a plurality electoral rule (Hicken, 2006: 
385). The reformers also strengthened political parties and voters’ attachment 
to them by adding 100 seats to the lower house (Kuhonta, 2006: 374) and by 
adopting a 5% vote threshold for political parties competing for party seats 
(Hicken, 2006: 385). Taken together, these changes in electoral rules were seen 
as favouring a democratic politics dominated by two large catch all or bridging 
parties (Ammar, 2011: 74) that would compete for votes by providing the public 
goods and policies necessary to sustain development (Hicken, 2005: 107).  
 Reformers also took several steps to strengthen prime ministers relative 
to political parties and cabinet members. They adopted more stringent 
requirements for a vote of no confidence in the lower house (Kuhonta, 2006: 
381) and required cabinet members to resign from their parliamentary seats 
upon joining the cabinet (Kuhonta, 2006: 381). They pushed through a 90-day 
party switching rule (Kuhonta,2006:381).  Finally, they created an incentive 
for prime ministers to choose cabinet members from those MPs elected from 
the party list (Kuhonta, 2006:381). These revisions made MPs and cabinet 
members more beholden to the prime minister while also making it more 
difficult for opposition parties to launch a no-confidence vote. At the same time, 
constitutional reformers proposed setting up watch dog agencies, including 
an independent Electoral Commission, an independent National Counter 
Corruption Commission, and a Constitutional Court (Kuhonta,2006: 379), 
to increase public accountability and reduce both the abuse of power and the 
rampant corruption in the political system (Hicken, 2006: 386). 
 The new constitution was passed on September 16,1997. Evidence 
suggests that reformers got at least some of what they wished for. Election 
results show that the new constitution pushed the party system in a centripetal 
direction as the effective number of parties in parliament declined from 7.2 
between 1986 and 1996 to 3.8 following the 2001 election and 2.6 following 
the 2005 election (Hicken, 2006: 389).  The  fall in the number of parties was 
so dramatic that for the first time in Thai history, a single party, Thai Rak Thai 
(TRT), nearly captured a majority of seats in 2001 (Hicken, 2006: 393). It 
finally did so in 2005 when it won 376 out of 500 seats (Hicken, 2006: 394). 
The shift to a centripetal party system alongside a strengthened prime minister 
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also brought greater stability in government as the average tenure of sitting 
governments rose from 10 months between 1992 and 2000 to 41 months between 
1997 and 2004 (Reilly, 2006: 154). 
 The shift to a more centripetal democracy had one other salutary effect. It 
led parties and governments to offer voters clear programmatic policy choices, 
particularly in health care (Selway 2011). This was especially true of Thaksin’s 
TRT party (Selway, 2011:177-179), but it was also true of the Democrat Party 
(2011: 177-180). As Ammar (2011,75) says, Thaksin ran a brilliant campaign 
in 2001 by offering voters several clear, new, popular policies — a 30 baht 
health scheme, a debt moratorium (Chambers, 2013: 90), and a village grant 
programme. He also ran against the Democrat Party’s neo-liberal reform 
programme (Ammar, 2011: 75) promising to rebuild Thai capital by nurturing 
competitiveness and deepening Thai capitalism (Pasuk and Baker, 2004: 112-
118). Thaksin’s welfare proposals were so wildly popular with rural Thais 
that his party won almost a majority of seats in the 2001 election (Hicken, 
2006: 394).  He built a durable majority government (Hicken, 2006: 405) and 
delivered on his promises (Ammar, 2011:75). In 2005, his party captured an 
outright majority (Hicken, 2006: 394). Not surprisingly, all the other major 
political parties quickly followed suit by offering clear national programmatic 
policies to voters (Selway, 2012: 66). 
 After dabbling with a protectionist development strategy (Ammar, 2011: 
75), Thaksin adopted a dual track economic development strategy. The first 
track emphasised macroeconomic stability and openness to trade and investment 
(Chambers, 2013: 89, Ammar, 2011: 76 and Thitinan, 2010). The second track 
consisted of state welfare policies for rural Thais (Chambers 2013: 90). Since 
the latter potentially impinged on the former, Thaksin kept public debt and the 
fiscal balances from deteriorating by rationalising and substantially reallocating 
health care expenditures to make those expenditures more consistent with his 
goals (Hicken and Selway, 2012: 65-68).  As a result, macroeconomic stability 
and a competitive exchange rate were maintained (Ammar, 2011:73) and growth 
of real GDP per capita was quite robust averaging 4.1% per year (World Bank 
2013).  While the centripetal aspects of Thailand’s 1997 constitution worked 
well, other elements were less successful (Kuhont, 2006a: 386-388; Case,2007: 
631-632). For many, one-party government began to look like a return to 
authoritarianism. As public opposition to Thaksin grew, elite support cracked 
and on September 19, 2006, the military took over the government in a coup.
 For all but 11 months since the coup, Thai governments have been 
dominated by stand-in parties for Thaksin and TRT.  Moreover, despite the
passage of a new constitution in August of 2007 specifically designed to re-
fragment democratic politics (Hicken and Selway, 2012: 69 and 73) a widening
of the regional, rural—urban, and class divide exploited by TRT and its main 
opponent, the Democrat Party, hardened so even though there was a return 
Michael T. Rock40
to multi-party government, there was only a modest uptick in the number of 
parties in government (Hicken and Selway, 2012:77).  Subsequently, the stand-
in for TRT, the Pheu Thai Party, won an absolute majority of seats (266 out of 
500) in the 2011 election. This election pitted Southerners, civil servants and 
more well off urbanites against poor rural Thais in the North and in Northeast 
Thailand (Hicken and Selway, 2012:74).  Given the salience of these cleavages, 
throughout the post-2006 coup period political parties and governments 
continued to act in a centripetal way by offering and delivering programmatic 
policies and programmes to voters.      
 In sum, the shift toward a more centripetal and developmental democracy 
played an important role in restoring the technocrats to their position as arbiters 
of sound macro-economic policy-making, in maintaining support for trade 
liberalization and investment, and in the creation of a wider social safety net that 
were successful in preventing inflationary pressures or significant deterioration 
of the fiscal balance. This combination of policies enabled Thailand to achieve 
the growth rates achieved by the predecessor autocratic governments. 12
 The return of politically-neutral technocrats as the final arbiters of 
macroeconomic policies should not be surprising. The economists in the core 
macroeconomic agencies have demonstrated their worth to elites in the military, 
bureaucracy, and business by delivering rapid growth and keeping inflation in 
check. Given that Thai voters of all stripes now expect candidates for office to 
have a clear policy position on a range of issues (Selway, 2011: 174), it would 
be somewhat shocking if they did not hold them accountable for poor economic 
performance. As a result, politicising these core agencies has to look like a risky 
political strategy for elected officials.
 The same can be said about Thailand’s open economy development 
strategy. It too has delivered high and relatively stable growth. Turning away 
from this strategy must look risky to democratically elected politicians. There 
is evidence of this in Thaksin’s early years as prime minister. He had initially 
decried Thailand’s dependence on East Asian export-led development strategy 
and toyed with an internally-led development strategy (Ammar, 2011: 75). But 
as criticism mounted, Thaksin quickly changed course by adopting a dual-track 
development strategy.
 The one “real” innovation in economic policy since the emergence of 
Thailand’s democratic developmental state has been Thaksin’s 30-baht health 
scheme, aimed at rural Thais. But is this really new? Previous governments and 
the Democrat Party had introduced several similar programmes that worked 
(Selway, 2011: 180). Following the enactment of the 1997 constitution leaders 
in the Democrat Party realised that it would be important for them to respond 
to voters clamouring for a stronger social safety net (Selway, 2011:180) and 
it is important to say they did and did so effectively (Selway, 2011:180). 
That said, it must be noted that he and his successors have delivered on their
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campaign promises and they did so, like the Democrat Party before them, 
without triggering inflation and without a significant increase in public debt 
or a marked deterioration in the public sector fiscal balance.  
 What made all of this possible  was the emergence of a more majoritarian 
democracy following adoption of the 1997 constitution which linked voters, 
local candidates for office and party leaders in an incentive system which 
delivered more broad-based national policies (Selway, 2011). This development 
is due to voters demands and because  candidates for political office now see it 
in their interest to affiliate with political parties that deliver what voters want. 
It is also a consequence of a recognition by party leaders  that it is in their 
interest to develop and implement broad-based national programmes that meet 
the needs of the electorate.
  
5.  Conclusion
What should one make of these case studies?  First, they confirm what a growing 
body of theoretical and empirical work demonstrates — when it comes to the 
impact of political institutions on growth, the devil really is in the details (Person 
and Tabellini, 2006).  Broad political regime type (autocracy vs democracy) 
appears to be less important to growth than whether the micro institutions 
embedded in particular regime types enable and/or encourage governing elites 
to provide the public goods and policies deemed necessary to stimulate growth. 
 As the literature on Indonesia and Thailand show, political elites initially 
relied on developmentally-oriented authoritarian regimes for economic 
growth.  But as is well known, autocracies outside East Asia have not been 
particularly good at stimulating economic growth. The literature on authoritarian 
regimes suggests that differences in growth outcomes are due to significant 
institutional differences among the former. At least in Indonesia and Thailand, 
the authoritarian regimes built several enduring and growth enhancing 
institutions - including a competent public sector bureaucracy in macroeconomic 
management and fiscal policy -that was insulated from popular pressures. At 
the same time, paramount political leaders had their own reasons for adopting 
pro-growth and development policies. Nothing like this particular political 
formation has appeared in sub-Saharan Africa, a region which, until not so 
long ago, has been characterised by a large number of authoritarian regimes. 
There the micro institutions of autocracy were used to buttress neo-patrimonial 
ties  to clients that were good at providing patronage, but poor at providing the 
public goods or policies necessary for growth (van de Walle, 2001). 
 Something similar appears to be at work within the democratic political 
institutions in IMT. The political elites there deliberately constructed a set of 
centripetal democratic institutions that facilitated the emergence of  democratic 
developmental states. But the reasons they did so differed.  In Indonesia, political
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elites constructed a centripetal democracy after the collapse of the New Order 
because they feared a return to the fissiparous politics of the 1950s (Horowitz, 
2013). In Malaysia an ethnic division of labour, political awakening within 
dominant ethnic communities, world war and a communist insurgency inflamed 
ethnic divisions. Following independence, inter-ethnic strife exploded in 1969. 
Given this history it is not surprising that political elites created centripetal 
democratic institutions to ameliorate inter-ethnic strife (Slater, 2010: 93). In 
Thailand, political elites created a centripetal democracy to overcome several 
pathologies in Thai politics, in particular political instability and rampant vote-
buying and corruption. In each instance, centripetal democratic institutions 
proved to be particularly  fertile grounds for the pursuit of development as they 
enabled and enticed political elites to provide the public goods and policies 
necessary for growth. 
 Third, the success of IMT’s developmental democracies in sustaining high 
growth occurred under quite different institutions of centripetal democracy 
suggesting that the political requisites for engineering the emergence of 
democratic developmental states may be wider than most think. Three core 
institutional differences— forms of executive government, electoral rules, and 
differences in political party formations mattered. Malaysia’s semi-democratic 
developmental state relies on a parliamentary form of government, a plurality 
electoral rule in single-member districts, and a multi-ethnic alliance of 
ethnically-based political parties that pools votes across a single slate.  Neither 
Indonesia nor Thailand uses this particular political formation. While Thailand, 
like Malaysia, relies on a parliamentary form of government, Indonesia does 
not.  With respect to electoral rules, Thailand, like Malaysia, used a plurality 
electoral rule in single member districts under the 1997 constitution, but 
following the 2006 coup it shifted back to a block vote in multi-member districts. 
Despite this return, Thai democracy continues to exhibit centripetal tendencies. 
Indonesia on the other hand uses a proportional electoral rule in multi-member 
districts, but offsets the centrifugal consequences of this electoral system by 
requiring political parties to meet stringent geographic coverage restrictions 
and equally stringent vote thresholds. Both have worked to significantly reduce 
the number of parties in government and push parties to the political centre. 
Third, neither Indonesia nor Thailand relies on ethnic-based political parties or 
political alliances to compete in elections or to govern after winning elections. 
These institutional differences among the democratic developmental states in 
IMT suggest that there are multiple pathways political elites can use to craft 
democratic developmental states. While some of these may well be path-
dependent, not all are. 
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Notes
1 What follows with respect to Indonesia is a revised version of a similar argument 
that appears in Rock (2013).
2 Between 1990 and 1997, real GDP grew at an annual average rate of 7.58%, 
inflation averaged 8.7%, the fiscal balance as a share of GDP was 1.2%, the 
current account balance as a share of GDP was -2.45%, the Gini Index was 29.9 
and the head count incidence of poverty was 17.6% (World Bank, 2012). 
3    In 1998, Indonesia was relatively poor, ethnolinguistic fractionalisation was 
high, it possessed a small middle class and an equally small working class, and 
its dominant religion was thought to be an impediment to democracy (Webber 
,2006:403).      
4         A test of the hypothesis that mean growth rates in real income per capita are the 
same under democracy (t=.53, p=.59.) or under centripetal democracy (t=.10, 
p=.91) as under the New Order (1966-1998) do not reject this hypothesis. This 
result does not change if New Order growth rates are from 1970 to 1998 or if 
the focus is on growth rates for real GDP instead of real GDP per capita where 
a difference of means test does not reject (t=.46, p=.64) the hypothesis that 
mean growth rates are the same.
5     Tinkering with electoral rules, political party laws, and constituency size 
continued well past 2004 benefitting larger parties and incumbents (Horowitz, 
2013: 199-206).  
6      For example, in 2004 Yudhoyono campaigned on a promise to achieve a 6% 
GDP growth rate (Liddle and Mujani, 2006: 137) and he delivered on it as real 
GDP grew by 5.9% during his first term (World Bank, 2012). He also promised 
to clean up corruption, which he did as Indonesia’s score on the Control of 
Corruption Index of the Political Risk Service rose from a low of 1 throughout 
Megawati’s presidency to 3.58 by the end of Yudhoyono’s first term (Political 
Risk Services Group, 2013).   
7          For example, poor economic performance (real GDP grew at 4.5% - World Bank, 
2012) and poor performance of Megawati’s presidency in terms of weeding out 
corruption cost her votes (Liddle and Mijani, 2006: 133).
8      During Yudhoyono’s first term, his most popular initiative was the launching 
of an aggressive anti-corruption campaign that netted a number of high profile 
perpetrators such as legislators, bureaucrats and investigators (Meitzner, 2009: 
150-151) and correspondingly Indonesia jumped 17 ranks in Transparency 
International’s Corruption Perceptions Index (Meitzner, 2009: 147).
9 Criticisms can be found in (MITI, 1999; Best 1999; Tan 1999; Rasiah 1998; 
Malaysia, 1991); Jomo, chapter one; Felker and Jomo, 2002; and McKendrick 
et al., 2000).
10   A regression of the fiscal surplus as a percentage of GDP on time yielded a 
negative and statistically significant coefficient for time.  The estimated equation 
is FS/GDP = -.52 -.16 T.  R2 = .49, t = 4.88 with N = 27. 
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12    The  average annual growth rate of real GDP per capita was 4.95% per year 
between 1960 and 1973, 4.32% per year between 1974 and 1987, and 4.43% 
between 1988 and 2012 (World Bank, 2012). A simple difference of means test 
fails to reject the hypothesis that mean growth rates fell as Thailand democratised 
(t=.38, prob=.71). In addition, there is no difference in growth rates (t=.1.34, 
prob.=.19) in the heyday of Thailand’s developmental autocracy (1960-1973) 
compared with its majoritarian democracy (2001-2012).     
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